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Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and
Inequality in Premodern Societies
Domestication Alone Does Not
Lead to Inequality
Intergenerational Wealth Transmission among Horticulturalists
by Michael Gurven, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Paul L. Hooper,
Hillard Kaplan, Robert Quinlan, Rebecca Sear, Eric Schniter,
Christopher von Rueden, Samuel Bowles, Tom Hertz, and Adrian Bell
CA Online-Only Supplement: Estimating the Inheritance of Wealth in Premodern Societies
We present empirical measures of wealth inequality and its intergenerational transmission among
four horticulturalist populations. Wealth is construed broadly as embodied somatic and neural capital,
including body size, fertility and cultural knowledge, material capital such as land and household
wealth, and relational capital in the form of coalitional support and field labor. Wealth inequality is
moderate for most forms of wealth, and intergenerational wealth transmission is low for material
resources and moderate for embodied and relational wealth. Our analysis suggests that domestication
alone does not transform social structure; rather, the presence of scarce, defensible resources may
be required before inequality and wealth transmission patterns resemble the familiar pattern in more
complex societies. Land ownership based on usufruct and low-intensity cultivation, especially in the
context of other economic activities such as hunting and fishing, is associated with more egalitarian
wealth distributions as found among hunter-gatherers.
This paper quantifies the level of inequality in the types of
wealth common to small-scale horticultural populations and
the extent to which wealth is correlated across generations.
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Knowledge of the variability in each wealth type, how different
wealth types combine, and the extent to which wealth is cor-
related across generations can help us address several impor-
tant questions concerning the evolution of inequality: (1) Is
inequality more common for certain types of wealth? (2) To
what extent does inequality in one generation impact the level
of inequality in the next? (3) How much socioeconomic status
mobility exists across generations? (4) Do different horticul-
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tural populations show similar patterns of inequality within
and across generations, such that generalizations about hor-
ticultural production systems can be made?
We start by exploring the commonalities among popula-
tions that use horticulture as their primary production system,
basing our analysis on empirical data collected among extant
horticulturalists: Dominicans, Mandinka of Gambia, Pimbwe
of Tanzania, and Tsimane of Bolivia.
Horticultural Production System
Horticulture, or “garden cultivation,” describes small-scale,
low-intensity agricultural production based on human labor
inputs and simple tools (Bates 2001). Subsistence is based on
modification of plants and their environments in order to in-
crease their productivity and utility to people. Production is
aimed at household provisioning rather than cash-cropping or
export. Horticulturalists also commonly engage in substantial
fishing, hunting, or other extractive foraging activities, but the
bulk of the diet comes from domesticated plant species culti-
vated in garden plots.1 Unlike many foraging groups, however,
horticulturalist households are characterized as relatively self-
sufficient. Access to more predictable and storable agricultural
produce attenuates interfamily resource sharing and increases
sedentism and territoriality. For example, food-sharing net-
works are more restricted among Ache who live on permanent
settlement and grow crops on private plots than among those
who forage nomadically in the forest (Gurven, Hill, and Kaplan
2002). Horticulturalists tend to live in aggregations that are
larger and more sedentary than those of foragers. Available
evidence from precontact societies suggests that raids and in-
tergroup aggression are fairly common among horticulturalists
or at least as common as among foragers (Keeley 1996; Wran-
gham, Wilson, and Muller 2006). Table 1 describes domestic
organization, descent patterns, settlement patterns and village
size, property right, and wealth stratification among the 83
horticulturalist societies from Murdock and White’s (1969)
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS).
Horticultural production first appeared in Southwest Asia
and the Middle East during the Neolithic 9,000–11,000 years
ago and in other geographical regions by 3,000–6,000 years ago
(Bellwood 2005). Plant domestication and animal domestica-
tion have been viewed as watershed processes in the develop-
ment of human cultures and civilizations. All civilizations have
been based on cultivation of one or more of six plant species:
wheat, barley, millet, rice, maize, and potatoes. Population pres-
sure, climatic and environmental change, reduced densities of
large animals, and cultural transmission have been cited as key
ingredients in the adoption of food production (Flannery 1973;
Rindos 1987). Variability in the timing and expression of ag-
riculture has been related to local differences in these factors
1. Because much of the protein and lipids in the diet often come from
animal and fish consumption, these groups have often been referred to
as horticulturalists-foragers or forager-horticulturalists.
and in the availability of domesticable species and trade net-
works (Diamond 1999; Harris 1977).
Horticultural societies vary along ecological, social, and po-
litical dimensions, but commonalities can be identified (Bates
2001). First, horticulturalist households tend to be relatively
independent and make their own decisions in regard to food
production without centralized authority. Second, horticul-
ture provides relatively low yield per land area, and so sur-
pluses are unusual. Farming techniques found in many hor-
ticultural systems are slash-and-burn and polyculture.
Slash-and-burn involves the clearing and burning of trees and
brush to reduce competition from wild plants and to add soil
nutrients from the ashes. After several cycles, productivity
declines as a result of low nitrate and potassium levels, and
the cleared areas are left fallow to return to brush or forest.
Polyculture involves a mix of crops or varieties interspersed
in the same field, including root crops, fruit trees, palms, and
cereals (maize, millet, barley, or rice). The mix of crops en-
sures ground cover for most of the year and helps prevent
erosion. A reliance on tree crops is also common. As gardens
“age,” the combination of trees and crops will vary. Relatively
short cropping periods and long fallows mean that new fields
may be created frequently. Third, horticulture relies on simple
tools such as digging sticks, hoes, machetes, and axes rather
than plows, machines, or irrigation. Without irrigation, hor-
ticulturalists depend on the seasonal cycle of rainfall. Hor-
ticulture is best suited to humid, tropical conditions, where
more intensive techniques such as monocropping and clear-
cutting, in combination with heavy rainfall, often lead to soil
erosion and degradation and fungal infections of crops.
Wealth
For many horticulturalists, wealth is somatic: stored in human
bodies and channeled into growth, reproduction, and im-
mune function. Most horticultural populations do not prac-
tice efficient birth control, and fertility tends to be relatively
high, averaging more than five offspring per woman (Bentley,
Jasienska, and Goldberg 1993; Wood 1994). A wealthy hor-
ticulturalist is healthy, well fed, and fertile.
Ecological knowledge is important for efficient food pro-
duction. While several studies emphasize the difficulty of
hunting (Gurven, Kaplan, and Gutierrez 2006; Ohtsuka 1989;
Walker et al. 2002), horticulture may also require substantial
knowledge and skill to learn proper timing for burning, plot
rotation, planting techniques, pest control, and soil manage-
ment (Conklin 1957). Although the bulk of the calories in
horticultural groups comes from carbohydrate staples, such
as yams, plantains, and rice, much time is spent engaging in
other activities that provide important nutrients as well as
prestige, such as hunting and spear fishing (Hames 1989).
Animal domestication is not uncommon but is usually con-
fined to small animals such as chickens, goats, pigs, and sheep.
Despite the self-reliance of horticultural households, social
networks through kinship or alliances are important to insure
Table 1. Geographic, social, and inheritance characteristics of n p 83 horticultural societies
Characteristics Percentage (%)
Region:a
Africa 18.1
Circum-Mediterranean 3.6
East Eurasia 12.0
Insular Pacific 28.9
North America 9.6
South America 27.7
Domestic organization:
Independent nuclear families, monogamous 3.6
Independent nuclear families, occasional polygyny 26.5
Polygyny 16.9
Minimal (stem) extended families 6.0
Small extended families 16.9
Large extended families 28.9
Descent:
Patrilineal 34.9
Duolateral/bilineal 7.2
Matrilineal 22.9
Quasi lineages 4.8
Ambilineal 3.6
Bilateral 26.5
Mean size of local villages:
!50 13.3
50–99 18.1
100–199 14.5
200–399 12.0
400–1,000 12.0
1,000–5,000 1.2
5,000 2.4
Settlement patterns:
Migratory or nomadic 7.2
Seminomadic 8.4
Semisedentary 6.0
Compact impermanent settlements 3.6
Dispersed family homesteads/separated hamlets 27.7
Compact, permanent settlements 43.4
Complex settlements 3.6
Inheritance of real property:
Absence of property rights or inheritance rules 31.3
Matrilineal (sister’s sons) 3.6
Other matrilineal heirs (e.g., younger brother) 7.2
Children (with daughters receiving less) 4.8
Children (equally for both sexes) 2.4
Other patrilineal heirs (e.g., younger brothers) 6.0
Patrilineal (sons) 20.5
Distribution of property among individuals of same category:
Real property:
Equal or relatively equal 24.1
Exclusively or predominantly to the one adjudged best qualified .0
Ultimogeniture (to the junior individual) 1.2
Primogeniture (to the senior individual) 15.7
No rules or insufficient information 57.8
Movable property:
Equal or relatively equal 44.6
Exclusively or predominantly to the one adjudged best qualified 1.2
Ultimogeniture (to the junior individual) 2.4
Primogeniture (to the senior individual) 13.3
No rules or insufficient information 38.6
Class stratification (prevailing type):
Absence among freemen 45.8
Wealth distinctions 24.1
Elite (control of land, etc.) 2.4
Dual (hereditary aristocracy) 25.3
Complex (social classes) 2.4
Note. The 83 societies were defined by groups showing “casual agriculture,” “extensive or shifting agriculture,” and
“horticulture,” from the 186 societies comprising the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (Murdock and White 1969).
aPercent of 83 societies.
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long-term livelihood (Hadley, Borgerhoff Mulder, and Fitz-
herbert 2007; Patton 2005). Networks are vital for soliciting
aid during episodes of sickness or disability (Sugiyama and
Chacon 2000), crop failure (Hadley 2004), and recruiting allies
during conflict (Patton 2005). Indeed, many horticulturalists
in the Amazon and New Guinea were involved in frequent
raiding of their neighbors (Keeley 1996). Physical size and mus-
cular strength are associated with others’ perceptions of dom-
inance. Prestige and leadership are based largely on behavioral
attributes, such as intelligence, charisma, and oratory skill, and
are achieved and maintained through social support (Henrich
and Gil-White 2001; von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2008).
Numerous studies examine status differentials among hor-
ticulturalists (mostly men) and link these to favorable cultural
outcomes. Owners of more land and with resident parents
show higher reproductive success (RS) in the Caribbean
(Flinn 1986; Quinlan and Hagen 2008). High-status Ifalukese
men marry at younger ages, and their wives have higher fer-
tility because of smaller interbirth intervals (Turke and Betzig
1985). Yanomamo¨ with unokai status for killing other men
have more wives and more surviving children (Chagnon
1988). Better Tsimane and Piro hunters show greater fertility
and RS (Gurven and von Rueden 2006). Healthier and taller
adults also show higher fitness among rural Kavango in Na-
mibia (Kirchengast and Winkler 1995, 1996) and rural Gam-
bians (Sear 2006; Sear, Allal, and Mace 2004). Polygyny is
fairly common among horticulturalist societies, where men
compete to obtain multiple wives.
As among foragers, material wealth is limited among most
horticulturalists. Food is often used as a currency for ex-
change, recruitment, and signaling, beyond immediate con-
sumption. Other rare and valued materials may signal wealth,
such as shells, carved stone, ivory, bone, ceramics, tools, and
decorative objects. In resource- or land-limited regions, how-
ever, access to land, water, fish, or game may be restricted,
and so access to territories and farming land may be controlled
and transmitted through lineages.
Few studies have measured variability in wealth holdings
among horticulturalists. An analysis of rice holdings, cash
income, and household assets among 511 households from
59 Tsimane villages revealed Gini coefficients ranging from
0.28 for household wealth to 0.54 for cash income (Godoy
et al. 2004). Interestingly, there was little increase or decrease
in inequality among villages that varied by level of accultur-
ation. In two villages, Gini coefficients of 0.31 and 0.38 were
calculated for number of close kin, a form of relational wealth
(von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2008).
Equality and Inequality
Sexual Division of Labor
Sexual divisions of labor are present in horticultural societies.
Men’s activities sometimes receive higher public recognition
than do women’s, although men’s work and women’s work
have also been viewed as “separate but equal” spheres (Collier
1988; Sanday 1981). There may be less division of labor
among horticulturalists than among foragers because both
men and women contribute to horticulture. Some notable
exceptions to sexual egalitarianism exist, from common men-
strual taboos to punishment of female disobedience by group
rape among the Mundurucu (Murphy and Murphy 1974).
Some societies that engage in frequent warfare (e.g., Gebusi,
Mehinaku) have men’s houses, where socialization of boys
occurs separately from that of girls (Knauft 1985).
Status Differentiation
Not all horticulturalists fit the same traditional labels popular-
ized by Service (1962; e.g., band, tribe, or chiefdom) or those
popularized by Fried (1967; egalitarian, ranked, and stratified
societies). Many horticultural groups are fairly egalitarian and
autonomous but show more status differentiation than foragers.
Village leaders or headmen are often older charismatic adult
men with many kin ties and allies (Arhem 1981; Kracke 1978;
Maybury-Lewis 1974; Mindlin 1985; von Rueden, Gurven, and
Kaplan 2008); they often carry no real authority or power to
reward and punish but instead may coordinate activities, host
events, and negotiate relationships with outsiders. Horticul-
turalists characterized by high mobility, little storage, small
group size, and interdependence are more likely to be egali-
tarian, similar to foraging groups, whereas horticulturalists that
differ along these dimensions tend to display greater levels of
inequality, as found among complex hunter-gatherers (Testart
1982). Property ownership and territoriality are more culturally
explicit among horticulturalists than among many foragers,
while leveling mechanisms designed to maintain egalitarianism
(Wiessner 1996) are less evident but not absent. Accusations
of witchcraft or sorcery among aggrandizers are common in
horticulturalist societies (Hill and Gurven 2004; Paciotti and
Hadley 2003). Extensive wealth accumulation and self-aggran-
dizing are atypical among egalitarian horticulturalists. Craft and
ritual specialists, politicians, and formal leaders are not un-
common (Chagnon 1968; Johnson and Earle 1987). In the past,
when skirmishes over arable land were likely less of a problem
than today, competition may have been greater over labor to
work fields and generate surplus. The need for labor sometimes
was reflected in a formal or legal possession of slaves (Koptyoff
and Miers 1977). Slavery is rare among ethnographically present
societies, although several horticulturalist populations tradi-
tionally had slaves (Colson 1960; Stearman 1988); 21 out of
the 83 horticulturalist societies from the SCCS show former
presence of slavery.
In contrast to Amazonians and several African farmers, island
horticulturalists such as those in Oceania show greater status
and wealth differentiation. Big-men and great-men leaders typ-
ical of these societies possess greater political influence, larger
gardens, and more material wealth than do other group mem-
bers (Turke and Betzig 1985). These societies are found where
resources are densely concentrated, predictable, and defendable
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and where surpluses are created. Surpluses are generated by
labor recruitment efforts, competitive feasting, and redistri-
bution of prestige items such as shell bands and domesticated
pigs (Hayden 1996). Classic ethnographies of Trobriand Is-
landers (Malinowski 1922; Weiner 1976), Samoans (Gilson
1970), and Enga (Wiessner 2002) describe big men, the priv-
ileges that accrue to chiefly lineages, and competitive yam ex-
changes and feasts. For example, residential and yam houses
belonging to Trobriander chiefs are larger and more ornately
decorated than commoner houses. Chiefly status permits the
right to have multiple wives, engage in kula exchanges, and
avoid certain food prohibitions (Weiner 1988).
Other groups show a mixed egalitarian and ranked strat-
ification social structure, such as the Dani of Western Papua,
where leaders accumulate wealth and prestige but inequality
does not carry over to land ownership and farming. Instead,
Dani big men largely help organize rituals and war parties
(Heider 1990). Evidence for highly complex horticulturalist
societies is scant (but see Erickson 2000). Several kingdoms
in Africa were highly structured and prestige based, such as
the Asante of southern Ghana, a conquest state with kings
and chiefs who had lavish courts maintained by the trading
with Europeans of gold, kola nuts, and slaves (Fortes 1969).
But even among the Asante, land was held by matrilineages
for group members to farm as needed.
Sedentism, resource concentration and predictability, sur-
plus production and storage, and higher population density
have all been linked to greater inequality in subsistence pop-
ulations (Carneiro 1970; Hayden 1995; Testart 1982; Upham
1990). An often-cited but incomplete idea is that agriculture
permits a surplus sufficient to maintain nonproductive classes
such as warriors, priests, and politicians (Childe 1954) and
inequalities beyond those due to age, sex, and abilities. Surplus
production, however, is likely an endogenous outcome of
other inequality-generating factors, such as differential access
to patchy, predictable, and accumulable resources. When ter-
ritorial resources are concentrated in dense, high-quality
patches, they become “economically defensible,” leading to
monopolization by emergent elites (Boone 1992; Brown 1964;
Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978). Storage and accumulation
of material resources over time can lead to greater disparities
in wealth than exist when resources are transient. Leaders or
“managers” may arise to organize raiding parties, redistribute
resources, or deal with localized resource stress (Flannery
1972; Smith and Choi 2007). According to the “agency” ap-
proach to inequality emergence (Wiessner 2002), upstarts or
“aggrandizers” strive for influence by controlling access to
resources or by extracting labor from others through debt
cycles or coercion (Arnold 1995; Boone 1992). Nonelites,
however, are not necessarily deprived of resources. In a system
of “managerial mutualism,” subordinates may also benefit
when provided goods by elites who compete for prestige and
supporters (Boone 1992, 1998).
Intergenerational Transmission
Kinship is the basis for navigating social life and the flow of
goods and services in horticultural societies. One-third of
horticultural societies in the SCCS show patrilineal inheri-
tance, one-fourth show matrilineal inheritance, and one-
fourth show bilateral inheritance (table 1). More egalitarian
horticulturalists tend to show bilateral descent, such as among
the Gainj (Johnson 1982). One-third of societies show no
formal property rights or inheritance rules; among those that
do, the most common pattern is for property to be distributed
relatively equally among sons (table 1). Among more egali-
tarian horticultural societies, there is very little wealth to in-
herit, except perhaps land in more circumscribed areas and
occasional wealth items. Personal items may be burned or
buried with the deceased, while large or expensive items, such
as canoes, knives, and shotguns, are usually divided among
surviving family members (Murphy and Murphy 1974). In-
heritance of these items may be sex biased (Crocker 1990),
although women’s items may also pass to daughters-in-law
instead of daughters (Bohannan and Bohannan 1953). Land
privileges are often granted through usufruct. As long as crops
are growing in a field, permission must often be asked before
others may use the field (Bergman 1980). In the nonegali-
tarian Polynesian horticultural societies, property and land
rights are often organized strictly along descent group lines.
When land is continuously rotated with long fallow periods,
individual private ownership and land inheritance may not
be sensible. Instead, descent groups often own communal
land, and distribution of access rights to member households
is coordinated by lineage heads (Bohannan and Bohannan
1953; Holmes 1974).
Ethnographies report that sons and sometimes daughters
benefit from the social position of parents, particularly fathers
(Heider 1990). Leadership positions, however, are not usually
strictly heritable but remain in part dependent on individual
skills and personality (Wiessner 2002). Positions, however,
may be held by other family members. It is important to
acknowledge that traditional structures of horticulturalist so-
cieties with a history of chiefly lineages and kingdoms, such
as the Asanti, Ganda, and Shambala, are no longer intact. It
is possible that remaining horticulturalist societies, especially
those represented here, show less inheritance of individual-
level privilege and rights. However, even among the African
kingdoms mentioned above and the Classic Maya (Edmonson
1979), land was not held privately and most inhabitants were
commoners with communal access to farm land through their
lineages.
Sample and Methods
Overview
We present data from four horticultural populations: rural
Dominicans, Mandinka, Pimbwe, and Tsimane. Dominicans
are rural peasants of Dominica in the Caribbean. The Man-
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dinka and Pimbwe are dry-land farmers from the Gambia
and Tanzania, respectively, and the Tsimane are Amazonian
rain forest horticulturalist-foragers from Bolivia. Our reliance
on only four groups means that our sample cannot be rep-
resentative of horticulturalists either today or from the past.
The majority of the societies from the SCCS in table 1 come
from the insular Pacific (29%), Africa (18%), and South
America (28%). Today, many horticultural groups occupy
marginalized areas in the humid tropics and arid regions
where prospects for intensive agriculture are poor. Availability
of wealth data varies among our sample populations, as do
the levels of market integration and other indicators of ac-
culturation during the study periods. The largest number of
wealth measures exists for Pimbwe and Tsimane, and so we
devote more attention to these societies.
Rural Dominicans
Ethnographic background. Bwa Mawego, one of the least de-
veloped villages on the windward side of Dominica, contains
about 700 full- and part-time residents of mixed African,
European, and island-Carib descent (Quinlan 2005). Eco-
nomic activities include subsistence taro-based horticulture,
fishing, bay leaf oil production, banana production, shop-
keeping, and limited wage labor. Average annual household
income in Bwa Mawego is currently about EC$5,000
(US$1,850). Opportunities for education are limited. About
30% of villagers born between 1955 and 1986 have attended
“high school” equivalent to ninth and tenth grade in the
United States; older adults have less education. The popu-
lation is relatively healthy for the Caribbean region. Kinship
and family are the foundation of economic, social, and re-
productive behavior, with almost everyone in the village re-
lated by blood or marriage. Many households consist of sev-
eral women and their children; conjugal, single-mother, and
other alternative styles are also common (Quinlan and Flinn
2005). Several households of closely related kin often live
together in a family compound. There are several large pa-
trilineages and many small lineages; matrilineages are not rec-
ognized. Patrilineal descent provides individuals with access
to ancestral family lands through usufruct, which can be ad-
vantageous to individuals whose immediate family does not
own land.
Wealth measures. Land is the basis of economic production
in Bwa Mawego. Bwa den (bay leaf Pimenta racemosa L.) is
the primary source of cash. Villagers extract bay oil from bwa
den and then sell it to a cooperative that in turn sells the oil
to global distributors as an ingredient in soap and perfume.
Most villagers either own or work bwa den for income. Bwa
den field sizes (in acres) owned by living and recently dead
residents of the village who were aged 25 in 2005 were
estimated on the basis of interviews with two groups of locals
(Quinlan and Hagen 2008). Interrater reliability across the
two groups was moderate (Cronbach’s ), and reli-ap .68
ability tests based on kinship and sex suggest little bias in
field size estimation. Although women can and do own bwa
den, interrater reliability scores suggest that women’s claims
to land are somewhat ambiguous.
Mandinka
Ethnographic background. Four villages in the West Kiang dis-
trict of the Gambia were first studied by physician Ian
McGregor in 1950, chosen because of their remote location
and poor health profile (McGregor 1991). The residents are
mostly Mandinka, though the samples also include a minority
of Jola, former slaves of Mandinka. During the study period,
all villages practiced horticulture, with rice as the main sub-
sistence crop by the end of the study period. Additionally,
groundnuts were grown as a cash crop. Rights to land use
reside largely with men, and these rights are inherited patri-
lineally; however, women do the bulk of the subsistence farm-
ing and may occasionally own their own rice fields and pass
them to their daughters. Residence patterns are patrilocal, but
mobility is low so that most women marry within their natal
village. Transport links to other regions of the Gambia were
relatively poor during McGregor’s observation period, though
they have improved considerably over the past few decades.
Few individuals were educated until the late 1970s, when a
primary school was established in Keneba. Before the primary
school, only a few boys would have been sent away to receive
an Islamic education. In 1975, the Dunn Nutrition Unit
(DNU) set up a permanent research station and medical clinic
in Keneba, the largest village. The clinic had an immediate
effect on child mortality rates, while morbidity was less af-
fected (Rayco-Solon et al. 2004). Fertility, however, has only
recently started to decline, despite the availability of contra-
ception at the clinic. Before 1975, both fertility and mortality
were high: women averaged seven children, and more than
40% died by age 5 (Billewicz and McGregor 1981). Polygyny
was high, with most men acquiring more than one wife by
the time they reached late middle age. Men married much
later than women (mean age at first birth was 18 for women
but 31 for men) and therefore reproduced until much older
ages.
Wealth measures. Given the exclusive focus of McGregor and
the DNU on health and mortality, data exist for only two
forms of embodied wealth: anthropometric status and fertil-
ity/RS. We use data only from individuals who were alive and
reproduced in the pre-DNU period because of the substantial
influence of the DNU clinic. Anthropometric data were col-
lected between 1950 and 1980. Only individuals who reached
the age of 18 years were included in the analysis; average
weights were calculated for each person on the basis of re-
peated measurements. RS data are based on births occurring
before 1975 and calculated for only those individuals who
reached the age of 15 years before 1975. Age controls were
included for individuals to account for those who died or
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were censored before the end of their reproductive period, as
was a control for birth cohort. RS was defined as the number
of children surviving to age 5, and children censored before
the age of 5 were discounted according to their age-specific
probability of surviving to 5 years. Fertility and mortality data
were available from the demographic surveillance system,
which has recorded all births and deaths since 1950, supple-
mented by birth histories collected from those who began
reproducing before 1950. Only two of the four villages were
included in the RS analysis because demographic data were
thought to be underreported in the other two villages in the
early years of the study.
Pimbwe
Ethnographic background. The Pimbwe of the Rukwa Valley
(Tanzania) are mostly subsistence farmers who also seasonally
hunt, fish, and collect honey (Borgerhoff Mulder 2009). Until
Tanzanian independence (1963), the Pimbwe were subject to
internecine war and a chiefly system. Chiefly and other high-
ranking positions were transmitted to a sister’s son, although
inheritance sparked bitter disputes (Willis 1966). Below the
chiefly levels, Pimbwe society is eminently egalitarian, with a
virulent system of witchcraft accusations and counteraccu-
sations serving to dissuade anyone from rising above the
crowd (Paciotti and Hadley 2003) and with social order now
maintained at least in part by a local vigilante organization
(Paciotti and Borgerhoff Mulder 2004) and in part by the
organs of a modernizing state.
Pimbwe have no electricity and limited access to clean wa-
ter, all-weather roads, and (since 2006) mobile phones (Pa-
ciotti et al. 2005). Primary schooling has been available in
almost all villages since the early 1970s, although schools are
not well maintained or funded. The Pimwbe have little ac-
cumulated wealth. Less than 10% of the population own
smallstock (goats), which are generally used as cash savings
and sold only in times of need; the same is true for the more
commonly raised poultry. Families have rights to land through
cultivation, but land is largely freely available. Production is
limited by the availability of family labor and the health of
adult household members. Family illness is cited by Pimbwe
as one of the primary reasons for deficits in food production.
One source of cash among the Pimbwe is the sale of maize
and other cash crops such as sunflower, rice, and peanuts.
Average earnings from cash crops are very low and show high
interannual variation due to vagaries of weather and crop
damage by wildlife and pests. Some men earn income from
a seasonal craft or trade, such as fishing, hunting, honey pro-
duction, carpentry, dispensing traditional medicine, providing
witch doctor services, trading old clothes, and manual labor.
The primary source of women’s additional income is brewing
and distilling of maize, products sold either privately or in
one of the village bars.
Wealth measures. Analyses based on six surveys from 1995 to
2006 are focused on the villagers of Mirumba. The sample
includes all individuals aged 15 ever interviewed. Given the
lack of privately owned material wealth such as land, the
vagaries of livestock raising, and the near-complete erosion
of the traditional chiefly statuses, wealth in Mpimbwe is best
thought of as deriving from health, strength, fertility, and
control of (children’s) labor. Intergenerational transmission
is therefore investigated for weight, RS, household wealth, and
farming skill. RS is defined as the number of offspring sur-
viving to age 5 among women aged 45 and men aged 55.
Children who had not yet reached 5 years of age were weighted
according to their probability of surviving this period (.82).
Household wealth is measured as the currency value of the
sum total of household items, including the materials of the
house itself. Farming skill is measured as the number of
months a house was with maize in its granary. Land is freely
available and not strictly heritable, and so a household’s suc-
cess in providing food throughout the year is due not to
differential land ownership (although cultivated land was con-
trolled for in the measure) but rather to skills in farming,
storage, and resource management; dependency ratios are
closely correlated with land under cultivation. Maize pro-
duction and annual availability are subject to stochastic
shocks, such as inclement weather, changing river courses,
elephants, insect pests, and theft. Although not all of these
shocks can be directly countered, skill, foresight, knowledge,
wise planning, hard work, and good social relations with
neighbors and kin can help reduce the risks of spending many
months without food in the granary.
Tsimane
Ethnographic background. Tsimane are a subsistence-based so-
ciety of more than 8,000 forager-horticulturalists living in
more than 50 villages with fairly minimal external market
interactions. Horticultural fields containing a mixture of plan-
tains, rice, corn, and sweet manioc are fairly small (!1 ha)
and are left to fallow after several years of use, with new fields
created based on availability and ownership based on usufruct.
In more acculturated villages, fields are often larger because
rice is also sold as a cash crop. Fishing is common in all
Tsimane villages located near water rivers, oxbow lakes, or
lagoons. Hunting with shotguns, rifles, and bow and arrow
is common in interfluvial villages. Mobility was more com-
mon a generation ago, and with high fertility (total fertility
), extended families are often spread across numerousratep 9
communities. Villages are composed of clusters of related
households who often pool resources and labor.
Traditionally, there were no official leaders; older men and
shamans wielded community-wide influence (Daillant 1994;
von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2008). Very few shamans
remain today. In recent decades, Tsimane villages have
adopted a system of elected chiefs (corregidores) and other
officials in larger villages for representation purposes and in-
teraction with outside interests. Chiefs wield no real power;
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their main tasks are to hold and conduct meetings in the
event of conflicts, help organize community labor events, and
represent village interests in transactions with outsiders. They
are usually young or middle-aged men fluent in Spanish and
with some experience dealing with Bolivian nationals. In vil-
lages where loggers make deals with Tsimane, chiefs and their
families benefit more than other families. There is little ac-
cumulated wealth among Tsimane, and no consistent, robust
associations between market access and wealth inequality have
been demonstrated (Godoy et al. 2004). Items of value include
shotguns and rifles used for hunting, axes, radios, watches,
bicycles, and dugout canoes. Income is earned through spo-
radic wage labor opportunities with loggers, merchants, and
ranchers, while a small number of mostly men have been
trained as bilingual elementary education teachers. Another
source of wealth includes domesticated animals such as chick-
ens, ducks, and, in some rare cases, pigs and cows. Chickens
are often raised for consumption and sometimes for trade.
Pigs and cows are used for barter and also for consumption
during festivals. After death, a person’s belongings are usually
burned or buried with the person, although expensive durable
items such as shotguns are passed down to a relative (usually
a son).
Wealth measures. Data exist for eight types of wealth covering
the somatic-knowledge, material, and social domains that
comprise key components of Tsimane production and cultural
success. These include RS, body size, cultural knowledge,
hunting success, household wealth, field labor networks, and
alliances. Measures are constructed from data collected from
ongoing fieldwork as part of the Tsimane Health and Life
History Project (2002–2008). RS includes number of children
surviving to age 5 among women age 40 and men age 45,
with right-censored cases discounted by the average proba-
bility of surviving to age 5. Body size is measured as body
weight wearing light clothing taken during medical visits using
a portable weigh scale. Cultural knowledge is measured from
self-reported possession of a large number of sex-specific cul-
tural skills covering economic production, tool and craft man-
ufacture, song and story repertoire, and sociality. Each per-
son’s score is the proportion of sex-specific skills held (total
53 for women, 67 for men). Hunting success, measured by
the average number of calories gained per hour spent hunting,
is based on a combination of focal follows and interviews of
hunters and is reported in Smith et al. (2010, this issue).
Household wealth describes the sum monetary value (based
on the buying price in the nearest town) of shotguns, rifles,
watches, radios, bicycles, and domesticated animals among
all nuclear family members.
Cooperative labor partnerships are measured as the number
of helpers in horticultural tasks during the previous year,
based on interviews in 11 remote villages. Larger communities
that engage in more cash-cropping (mostly rice) were ex-
cluded from the sample. People paid in money, goods, or
farm product for their labor were not included in the tally.
Only father-son dyads were considered here. Alliances were
measured according to a ranking procedure where local raters
ranked sets of eight photos of their peers on the basis of who
would have more allies help them in the event of a conflict
(von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2008). A block design
insured that no two photos appeared together in the same
array more than once. The range of possible scores was 8–64.
Methodological Limitations
Table 4 presents the sample size of parent (F1) and offspring
(F2) dyads by wealth type for each of the four populations.
Sample sizes vary substantially and tend to be larger for more
easily measured variables, ranging from 41 for hunting skill
among Tsimane to 1,274 for weight among Mandinka.
Values for several F2 wealth measures are paired with the
midpoint value of their biological parents. This does not mean
that children consistently coresided with both of their bio-
logical parents. Our choice for F1 and F2, however, is the best
metric for capturing intergenerational transmission in social
systems where children may live with one, the other, or both
parents for at least the majority of their period of dependence,
in which there are no strict rules of intergenerational trans-
mission, and in which children learn primarily from the adults
in their household.
The reliance on F1-F2 dyads requires information on two
generations. For many individuals, death before study and
residence in a nonstudy village leave many unpaired individ-
uals. These are probably the largest possible sources of bias.
Trait values for complete F1 and F2 generations were compared
with those remaining after removing unpaired individuals.
The most common bias favors stable group members and
disfavors immigrants or highly mobile individuals; the re-
peated panel design of the Mandinka, Pimbwe, and Tsimane
studies helps to reduce this bias.
While the four populations lived fairly traditional lifestyles
during the data collection periods, each has had a history of
interaction with other populations, national society, and in-
creasing integration to the market. Traditional subsistence ac-
tivities occur in the context of increasing formal education
of the current generation, cash-cropping, and wage labor.
Novel wealth types, such as competency in the national lan-
guage or years of formal schooling, were not analyzed here
because of the rapid pace of change. To some extent, we
attempted to control for some of the effects of acculturation.
Among Tsimane, where economic activities can vary in dif-
ferent parts of their territory, we added a “region” variable
to regressions to help control for both environmental varia-
tion and acculturation. Statistical methods for computing
wealth elasticity (b) for each wealth type and population are
described in the CA online supplement “Estimating the
Inheritance of Wealth in Premodern Societies” in the online
edition of Current Anthropology.
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Table 2. Judgments of a exponents for horticulture societies in the Cobb-Douglas production function
of household well-being
Population
Wealth type
Somatic Knowledge Embodieda Material Relational
Dominica .30 .20 .50 .20 .30
Mandinka .40 .15 .55 .20 .25
Pimbwe .40 .20 .60 .30 .10
Tsimane .25 .20 .45 .15 .40
Average .34 .19 .53 .21 .26
Standard deviation .07 .03 .06 .06 .13
aEmbodied wealth combines somatic wealth and knowledge-based wealth.
Figure 1. Ternary plot of for embodied, material,ap {e, m, n)
and relational wealth. The a’s describe the proportion of overall
household well-being due to each type of wealth. Circles refer
to horticultural populations, and the triangle represents the av-
erage for all four populations.
Results
Alphas (a’s) from Production Function
Table 2 presents each researcher’s judgment of the relative
importance of somatic (s), knowledge (k), material (m), and
relational (r) capital for overall production or cultural success,
hereafter referred to as “household well-being” (w; see Bor-
gerhoff Mulder et al. 2009). For comparability across the pro-
duction systems and to reduce ambiguity, we combine somatic
and knowledge wealth as embodied (e) wealth (Kaplan 1996).
The relative importance of different types of capital is de-
scribed by the a’s (alphas) from the Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion equation , wherea a ae m rwp A# E M R  d a a e m
(see Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009).2 Given the im-a p 1r
pressionistic nature of these judgments, we do not attempt
to explain small differences in a but instead highlight several
general patterns. Consistent with the typological descriptions
of wealth outlined in “Wealth,” material wealth does not ap-
pear to be a substantial component of household well-being,
contributing an average of only one-fifth (0.21) of total wealth
importance. Material wealth was judged to be the least im-
portant wealth type among all four populations. Embodied
wealth accounts for a substantial one-half (0.53) of well-being.
Two-thirds of this is somatic capital, and the remaining third
is knowledge. Finally, the a for relational social capital, con-
stitutes, on average, one-fourth (0.26) of the total wealth input
exponents. Table 2 reflects our impressions from “Wealth”
that emphasized the importance of relational capital for cul-
tural success, even (or especially) among egalitarian horti-
culturalists, and the lower importance of material capital.
Only hunter-gatherers show a higher mean a for relational
capital and a lower a for material capital (see Smith et al.
2010). Figure 1 illustrates the a’s for all horticultural popu-
lations in a ternary plot. Despite the geographic, ecological,
and cultural variation in our sample, there was a fairly low
2. A is a positive constant; E, M, and R are a household’s embodied,
material, and relational wealth, respectively; and d represents exogenous
shocks to a household’s wealth.
amount of variation in our judgments for somatic and knowl-
edge-based a’s.3
Wealth Inequality
Table 3 provides several common measures of inequality for
each population-specific wealth type. These include the stan-
dard deviation, the coefficient of variation, and the Gini co-
efficient. We focus attention on the Gini coefficient because
of its unit-free properties and wide usage. The Gini coeffi-
3. We briefly speculate on a few notable differences in a: Pimbwe
scored the highest for material wealth and the lowest for relational wealth,
perhaps owing to the highly uneven pace of integration and accumulation
of human capital. While strong, healthy bodies are critical for successful
food production and mate selection among Tsimane, their somatic wealth
a scored the lowest; overall well-being, especially during critical times of
need, may be affected more by variability in social networks than by
differences in somatic or knowledge-based wealth.
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Table 3. Mean level of each wealth variable and intrapopulation age-adjusted inequality as measured by standard
deviation (SD), coefficient of variation (CV), and Gini coefficient
Wealth class, group,
and wealth type Mean
Inequality measure
N
Mean
ageSD CV Gini
Embodied wealth:
Mandinka:
Weight 54.4 7.1 .13 .073 2,355 34
Reproductive success 3.7 2.3 .62 .328 1,935 43
Pimbwe:
Weight 56.7 8.2 .14 .079 395 33
Farming skill 4.4 2.4 .55 .308 507 43
Reproductive success 5.63 1.94 .34 .190 1,041 38
Tsimane:
Hunting returns 1,190.2 877.0 .74 .371 40 37
Cultural knowledge .7 .1 .14 .076 265 35
Weight 59.0 9.2 .15 .087 1,033 36
Grip strength 172.0 79.6 .46 .263 1,249 36
Reproductive success 7.09 2.5 .35 .190 1,288 38
Average .36 .196
Material wealth:
Dominicans:
Land .3 .4 1.56 .671 315 . . .
Pimbwe:
Household wealth 176.5 212.4 1.20 .563 614 40
Tsimane:
Household wealth 4,424 3,328 .75 .326 361 39
Average 1.17 .520
Relational wealth:
Tsimane:
Field labor partners 3.7 2.2 .58 .315 234 38
Alliances 38.1 9.4 .25 .141 130 38
Average .42 .228
cients for the 15 horticulturalist wealth measures range from
near 0 to more than 0.6, with a mean of 0.265 ( ,ep 0.20
, ). When weighted by the importance ofmp 0.52 rp 0.23
each wealth type to population-specific wealth (based on the
a’s), as well as by the inverse of their estimated variances (to
account for the differing degrees of precision of the various
estimates), the mean Gini across wealth classes dropped to
0.21. Material wealth consistently shows the highest levels of
inequality, on par with income inequality in the United States
(0.463 in 2007). We highlight some notable patterns by wealth
type. Material wealth has the highest average Gini (0.52), while
body weight has the lowest (0.08). Ginis for RS (0.24) and
skill/productivity (0.25) are intermediate. We hesitate to com-
pare inequality levels among societies, given the variable num-
ber of wealth categories for each population. Only among the
Tsimane do wealth data exist for all categories, resulting in
an a-weighted Gini of 0.17.
Intergenerational Wealth Elasticity (b)
Table 4 summarizes the estimate, the standard error, and the
statistical significance of the transmission coefficient between
parental wealth and offspring wealth (hereafter referred to as
b) by wealth type and population, as determined from mul-
tiple regression analyses described in the introductory paper
in this special section (Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder
2010, in this issue). Figure 2 illustrates several examples. Em-
bodied wealth is based on 10 measures from three societies,
material wealth is based on three measures from three soci-
eties, and relational wealth is based on two measures from
only one society. The overall b for horticulturalists, weighted
by the importance (a) of each wealth type in promoting
household well-being, is 0.18.
Embodied wealth. The mean b for embodied wealth for hor-
ticulturalists is 0.17 (table 4). Measures include body weight,
grip strength, RS, and hunting performance. Parent-offspring
elasticities for body weight are the strongest of all b’s, varying
from 0.25 to 0.39. Given the relatively large b’s for weight, it
is surprising that the b for grip strength is very small. Grip
strength is correlated with weight, given Tsimane leanness
(mean adult body mass index p 23). A similar high b for
weight but low b for grip strength was also observed among
the Hadza (Smith et al. 2010).
The b’s for RS were low, consistently !0.13. Additional
analysis by child (F2) sex, however, revealed consistently larger
b’s for sons than for daughters (parent-son vs. parent-daugh-
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Table 4. Wealth elasticities (b) for different wealth types among four horticultural populations
Wealth class, population,
and wealth type Transmission (b) SE P N pairs (F2)
Embodied wealth:
Mandinka:
Weight .391 .041 .000 1,274
Reproductive success .088 .086 .309 967
Pimbwe:
Farming skill .015 .097 .875 217
Weight .377 .096 .000 148
Reproductive success .057 .107 .592 599
Tsimane:
Hunting returns .384 .130 .003 26
Cultural knowledge .111 .094 .240 181
Weight .253 .069 .000 383
Grip strength .070 .042 .094 490
Reproductive success .128 .073 .079 849
Average .173 .047 .001 568
Material wealth:
Dominicans:
Land .137 .140 .327 62
Pimbwe:
Household wealth .107 .318 .735 283
Tsimane:
Household wealth .024 .071 .731 110
Average .090 .087 .309 152
Relational wealth:
Tsimane:
Field labor partners .181 .106 .086 67
Alliances .338 .103 .001 45
Average .260 .106 .020 56.0
Note. Averages are arithmetic. P values were calculated from two-tailed tests of hypothesis that true b for a given
row equals 0.
ter : Mandinka, vs. ;b SE 0.093 0.083 0.033 0.046
Pimbwe, vs. ; Tsimane,0.182 0.349 0.042 0.133
vs. ). Given the lower variance0.225 0.115 0.064 0.047
in RS among females than males in the mildly polygynous
Mandinka, Pimbwe, and Tsimane, women may find it easier
to obtain mates and support offspring, regardless of parental
RS. Although it might be expected that increased competition
with more siblings might reduce sons’ RS, larger kin groups,
especially of older sibs, might provide additional critical sup-
port in finding mates. A variety of alternative caretakers may
also help improve child survivorship relatively cheaply be-
cause of depreciating costs of babysitting and other care ac-
tivities. Parents with greater RS may themselves come from
larger sibships, which will provide a larger set of available
cross-cousins to marry in societies, such as Tsimane, where
the ideal mate is a cross-cousin.
Unlike the case for Tsimane hunting (discussed in Smith
et al. 2010), there is no intergenerational transmission for
Pimbwe farming skill. Even though farming production was
averaged across multiple years to reduce the effects of annual
variability, it is possible that stochastic factors in an unpre-
dictable and pest-ridden environment overwhelm heritably
transmitted knowledge. The farming skill measure also com-
bines knowledge with planning and work effort. Each of these
may be transmitted differently, and farming knowledge itself
might be widely available. Tsimane cultural knowledge shows
low intergenerational transmission, with . Manybp 0.11
common skills are readily obtained by Tsimane during de-
velopment and early adulthood; individual abilities and ex-
perience may swamp the effects of informal parent-offspring
social transmission.
Material wealth. The overall b for material wealth in this
sample is 0.09 (table 4). Data exist only for household wealth
and land. Household wealth showed no relationship. Among
Pimbwe and Tsimane, there is little household property trans-
mitted directly between parent and offspring households, es-
pecially because most household items last for only a few
years. Houses themselves survive for only about a decade.
Among Pimbwe, a fierce ideology of self-reliance limits in-
terhousehold sharing and kin support. When asked about
support received by others for food, school fees, and medical
bills, Pimbwe react with disgust, insisting on their indepen-
dence. Fear of sharing and dependence stems from deep con-
cerns with witchcraft that pervade all aspects of Pimbwe social
life. Help among households is somewhat low but more forth-
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Figure 2. Offspring (F2) and parental (F1) wealth, adjusted for age. A,
Weight among Mandinka ( ). B, Household wealth amongbp 0.391
Pimbwe ( ). C, Allies among Tsimane ( ). D, Landbp 0.107 bp 0.338
holdings among Dominicans ( ). Fathers’ age controls had nobp 0.137
effect on the elasticity estimates for land holding in Dominica and were
dropped to improve statistical precision.
coming among Tsimane. While complaints about the inad-
equacy of help received from others are common, there is no
similar ideology or concern about witchcraft. Tsimane ac-
cusations of sorcery are usually directed toward outgroup
members and, if anything, are more common when people
refuse to share.
We expected that transmission of material wealth to Do-
minican sons would be more substantial because of loose
patrilineal inheritance norms (Quinlan and Flinn 2005).
However, we found little evidence of intergenerational in-
heritance of land among Dominicans, with . Sonsbp 0.14
are often viewed as risky investments, and relatives other than
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children usually contribute many years of agricultural labor
to these plots. It is possible that these other relatives may
inherit land through oblique transmission. Parents sell bay
leaves and use the cash to finance children’s education and
migration. Bay leaf farming is recognized as difficult work,
so productive parents may use their profits to provide other
opportunities for children, although parents’ bwa den plot
size is not significantly associated with the probability of chil-
dren’s migration.
Relational wealth. Our only measures of relational wealth are
for the Tsimane: number of helpers assisting in agricultural
field activities and number of male alliances during conflicts.
Fathers with more helpers were somewhat more likely to have
sons with more helpers ( ). While this relationship isbp 0.18
not driven by the set of data points represented by parents
and offspring with no helpers, it is weakened by excluding
either shared individuals who help both F1 and F2 or help
exchanged between F1 and F2.
Allies are an important resource during interpersonal con-
flicts with other Tsimane and with Bolivian colonists, mer-
chants, or loggers. The number of named allies in the event
of a conflict is highly correlated with several measures of social
status and respect (von Rueden, Gurven, and Kaplan 2008).
The relationship between the number of parental and off-
spring allies was stronger than that found among labor part-
ners ( ). This result was not driven by parents andbp 0.34
offspring naming each other.
Discussion
Material wealth was considered the least important contrib-
utor of household well-being across the four horticultural
societies in our study, while embodied and relational wealth
were considered the most important (table 2). On average,
intergenerational transmission of material wealth was low,
even though inequality was relatively high (table 3). Embodied
and relational wealth are both important determinants of
well-being among horticulturalists. Physically robust and
healthy bodies are needed to produce and defend resources,
acquire the repertoire of cultural skills, and attract mates and
allies. Higher transmission coefficients were found for somatic
wealth (except RS) than for knowledge or skill. Cultural
knowledge and information may be easily obtainable from a
wide variety of kin, peers, and others, and/or individual ex-
perience and abilities may trump the value of any specialized
traditions or knowledge passed from parents to children. So-
cial networks are also important to horticulturalist household
well-being. The number and quality of kin and allies mediate
access to resources and mates and to support when conflicts
erupt or when one is disabled. Although based on data from
only one population, the level of intergenerational transmis-
sion for relational capital is nontrivial, with transmission co-
efficients averaging 0.26. A similar level of wealth elasticity is
found for embodied capital (average p 0.17).
Despite the implication that intergenerational wealth elas-
ticities are higher for the types of wealth that are more im-
portant in each society, we found no significant correlation
between our set of 15 a’s and b’s ( , ); thisrp 0.12 Pp .662
contrasts with the significant correlation reported for the
larger sample of hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists, pastor-
alists, and intensive farmers (Borgerhoff Mulder et al. 2009;
Smith et al. 2010). However, the relationship for horticul-
turalists improves after eliminating RS measures, which
showed consistently very low b’s ( , ).rp 0.38 Pp .217
The nontrivial b’s and measured inequality are remarkable,
given the roughly egalitarian nature of these four horticultural
societies. Overall wealth transmission (mean b weighted by
a) for horticulturalists is low (0.18), very close to that cal-
culated for hunter-gatherers (0.19), and about half of that
reported for pastoralists and intensive farmers (see Borgerhoff
Mulder et al. 2010, in this issue; Shenk et al. 2010, in this
issue; Smith et al. 2010). The importance of such low b’s,
however, should not be underestimated: a b of 0.2 implies
that a child born into the top wealth decile of the population
is 3.6 times more likely to remain in the top decile than is a
child whose parents were in the bottom decile (as discussed
in Bowles, Smith, and Borgerhoff Mulder 2010). The wealth
elasticities for each of the three wealth classes are also similar
among horticulturalists and hunter-gatherers, as is the overall
a-weighted Gini index measuring wealth inequality (0.27 for
horticulturalists vs. 0.25 for hunter-gatherers).
Given the b’s in table 4, we can say that the steady state
levels of variance in logarithm of wealth (a standard unit-free
measure of inequality) range from (material21.004# jl
wealth) to (relational wealth), where is a mea-2 21.034# j jl l
sure of the variance in wealth shocks in one generation and
the coefficient multiplier is (see Borgerhoff Mulder2 1(1 b )
et al. 2009). Thus, at equilibrium, there is greater inequality
in the wealth measures that are of greater utility to horti-
culturalists, that is, relational and embodied. Thus, not all
types of wealth are equally distributed and inherited across
generations. Another important conclusion here is that the
domestication of plants alone does not lead to greater in-
equality. Limited access to storable or defendable resources
such as land, technology, or animals is a necessary ingredient
for high levels of inequality to emerge. Such limitation is
minimal in our sample but is common among intensive ag-
riculturalists and pastoralists.
Although our inferences here refer to intact horticultural
societies, our four societies vary in their degree of accultur-
ation and market integration. Each has a history of contact,
conquest, and, to some extent, marginalization. It remains to
be seen how integration into the market economy has and
will continue to impact inequality. Production functions may
include a greater reliance on material wealth and new forms
of human capital, such as formal schooling, proficiency in
national language, and local politics. Relational capital may
include important contacts in distant locations for the pur-
pose of trade, cash-cropping, and wage labor opportunities.
62 Current Anthropology Volume 51, Number 1, February 2010
It is likely that novel forms of wealth show greater inequality
than traditional forms expressed in this paper, and so overall
inequality in extant horticultural societies may be more ex-
aggerated than the portrait given here.
The Kuznets hypothesis, proposed to explain differences in
inequality among nations, suggests an inverted U-shaped re-
lationship between economic development and inequality
(Kuznets 1955). At low levels of development, most work in
subsistence agriculture and land rights is based on usufruct.
With increasing market integration, economic inequalities in-
crease as subgroups selectively opt to obtain formal education,
sell produce, trade, and engage in wage labor or service oc-
cupations. At high levels of development, few practice sub-
sistence agriculture, and most, if not all, work for wages.
Presumably, income inequality decreases at higher levels of
economic development, accentuated by social welfare pro-
grams that promote redistribution. The only empirical test of
the Kuznets hypothesis in a small-scale society was done
among the Tsimane and did not lead to consistent, conclusive
results across wealth types or econometric specifications (Go-
doy et al. 2004). Greater inequality requires greater reliance
on limited, predictable, and monopolizable resources, partic-
ularly material wealth. Deliberate social norms that promote
economic redistribution will also dampen inequality. It is
noteworthy that the average Gini index of inequality from
our four populations is similar to that of Scandinavian coun-
tries that employ strong social welfare programs. Sharing
norms based on a risk-sharing foraging economy often re-
main, even if somewhat modified, following economic
change.
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